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Abstract 
 
We study how creditor rights and culture interact with one another to influence corporate dividend 
payout policy. Where creditor rights are strong, creditors accept the status quo, which are large dividends 
in individualist and small dividends in collectivist traditions, respectively. Culture influences dividend 
payout where creditor rights are weak. In collectivist countries where group cohesion among corporate 
stakeholders results in perceived lower agency costs of debt and equity, creditors place few if any 
restrictions on dividend payout given weak creditor rights. In contrast, in individualist traditions, creditors 
continue to restrict dividend payouts under weak creditor rights. Our findings emphasize the importance 
of accounting for the interactions between creditor rights and culture in determining dividend policy.          
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Dividend payout policy research has evolved to consider the possibility that factors’ other than 
firm-level characteristics, such as the law and national culture may influence dividend policy. Aggarwal 
and Goodell (2014, p. 107) suggest that “traditional finance journals are clearly quite deficient in their 
attention to culture and finance”. In reviewing the role that culture, social trust, and institutions play in 
determining transactions costs, they assert that “all finance research should include and reflect factors 
related to these softer measures in addition to traditional economic and financial factors” (see Aggarwal 
and Goodell, 2014, p. 106). In this paper we examine how creditor rights and culture interact with one 
another to influence corporate dividend payout policy.  
We draw together two strands of the dividend literature and study their interaction. The first 
strand, the dividend-creditor rights literature, demonstrates that creditor rights, a formal institution, exert 
a sizable influence over corporate dividend payouts. Brockman and Unlu (2009) test the La Porta et al. 
(2000) equity-only agency models of dividends inclusive of the agency costs of debt and show that it is 
creditors and not shareholders that exert the greatest influence over corporate dividend policy. Where 
creditor rights are weak, managers cater to the demands of creditors for lower dividends (the substitution 
hypothesis). Where creditor and shareholders rights are strong, creditors permit large dividend payouts 
(see Byrne and O’Connor, 2012; and Shao et al., 2013). The second strand, the dividend-culture literature, 
explores the link between culture, an informal institution, and corporate dividend payout in a purely 
agency cost of equity setting. Fidrmuc and Jacob (2010) show that dividend payouts are necessary large in 
individualist cultures because individuals pursue the individual rather than the collective goal, but are 
much lower where a sense of collectivism prevails. In individualist traditions large dividends compensate 
for the severity of the agency conflict which arises between insiders and outsiders. There is no need for 
large dividend payouts in collectivist traditions because of the close links and the sense of group cohesion 
which is fostered between insiders and outsiders.   
The dividend-creditor rights and dividend-culture literatures are distinct from one another, a 
distinction highlighted by the proponents of the dividend-culture viewpoint. They emphasize that agency 
conflicts are determined not only by an objective assessment of the severity of agency conflicts which is 
provided by legal rules, but also by a subjective assessment among individuals of the perceived extent of 
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agency conflicts, which is captured by culture. Furthermore, measures of creditor rights (culture) do not 
fully account for differences in culture (creditor rights) across countries, resulting in instances in which 
the objective assessment of the extent of agency conflicts provided by legal variables may be very 
different to the culturally determined perception of these same agency conflicts. In our sample there are 
countries that score lowly in terms of creditor rights, but are polar opposites where culture is concerned 
(compare Japan and the United States). Also, culturally-proximate countries can offer varying degrees of 
legal protection to creditors (compare Hong Kong and Thailand). Hence our sample exhibits sizable 
variation in culture and creditor rights across countries which make it possible for us to test how they 
interact with one another to influence corporate dividend policy. Thus, in this paper we test (a) the formal 
agency cost of debt and equity dividend-creditor rights relationship inclusive of culture by exploring the 
dividend-creditor rights relationship in countries defined as either individualist or collective, and (b) the 
informal agency cost of equity dividend-culture relationship inclusive of the agency costs of debt, by 
exploring the dividend-individualism relationship in strong and weak creditor rights regimes.    
First, we explore the dividend-creditor rights relationship in individualist and collectivist 
traditions. To date tests of the agency models of dividends have been conducted by including legal 
variables which provide an objective assessment of the severity of the agency costs of equity and debt. 
These studies show that creditors demand lower dividends given weak creditor rights, and permit the 
status-quo to be maintained where creditor rights are strong. Therefore, under strong creditor rights we 
expect large (small) dividend payouts to remain in individualist (collectivist) traditions. The level of 
dividend payouts in individualist and collectivist traditions given weak creditor rights are not as clear. 
Under weak creditor rights, we hypothesize that where the relationship between corporate insiders and 
outsiders is harmonious in collectivist cultures, creditors may not demand lower dividends. In this 
instance, creditors perceive that the agency costs of debt are much lower than those suggested under the 
legal code, and place few if any restrictions on corporate dividend payouts. In contrast, where both 
culture and the law suggest high agency costs of debt, creditors are much more likely to restrict dividend 
payouts. This suggests that it is when creditor rights are weak that legal rights and culture come together 
to influence corporate dividend policy. This line of reasoning leads to our first testable hypothesis, which 
is that we expect that dividend payouts are sensitive to creditor rights in individualist regimes, but much 
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less sensitive in collectivist regimes. The positive dividend-creditor rights relation espoused by Brockman 
and Unlu (2009) may occur in individualist traditions alone. Individualism serves to moderate the 
dividend creditor rights relationship resulting in a weaker or even negative dividend creditor rights 
relationship in collectivist traditions.      
Second, the dividend-individualism literature shows that dividend payouts are largest in cultural 
traditions where the perceived agency costs of equity and debt are high. Dividends are an outcome of high 
individualism. In this paper we test the dividend-individualism relationship inclusive of the formal agency 
costs of debt by examining whether these culturally-rooted outcome models of dividends hold under 
weak creditor rights? To date the dividend-individualism relationship under weak (or strong) creditor 
rights has not been examined. Under strong creditor rights we expect the positive dividend-individualism 
relationship documented in the literature to date to be maintained. Creditors, given strong legal standing 
will accept the status-quo, which are large dividends in individualist cultures. The dividend-individualism 
relationship under weak creditor rights is not clear.         
To test these assertions we use measures of individualism and creditor rights and explore how 
they interact with one another to influence corporate payout policy. We use a sample of 17,544 firms 
from 28 countries over the period from 1996 to 2007. We exploit cross-country variation in individualism 
and creditor rights, and in a series of pooled ordinary least squares, logit and Tobit regressions, we find 
support in favour of both of our hypotheses. The dividend-creditor rights relationship is positive and 
stronger where individualism prevails. In collectivist traditions, the relationship is weaker and sometimes 
negative because creditors do not demand lower dividends in collectivist regimes to compensate for weak 
legal standing. The positive dividend-individualism relationship is observed under strong creditor rights 
alone. Well-protected creditors consent to high dividends in individualist countries. Under weak creditor 
rights, the dividend-individualism relationship is negative. The culture-outcome model of dividends does 
not hold under weak creditor rights for two reasons. First, dividend payouts are much lower in 
individualist traditions because poorly protected creditors compel managers to pay lower dividends. 
Second, creditors do not demand lower dividends in collectivist cultures. The net effect is that under 
weak creditor rights, the dividend-individualism relationship is very often negative.   
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Finally, we are able to attach both statistical and economic significance to our findings. In 
individualist traditions, a worst-to-best change in creditor rights results in a change in dividends paid as a 
percentage of cash flow of 20.5 percentage points i.e., 5.4% to 25.9%. In collectivist societies, the same 
change in creditor rights results in a range of dividend payouts of just 1.9% i.e. 11.3% to 13.2%. In 
dividend-individualism regressions, where creditor rights are strong, dividends-to-cash flow ranges from 
12.3 to 13.2% across the individualism spectrum. Under weak creditor rights, a worst-to-best change in 
individualism results in a reduction in dividends paid from 20.4 to 5.1%. All in all, our findings say that 
poorly-protected creditors place few restrictions on dividend payout in collectivist traditions, but much 
larger restrictions where individualism prevails. Dividend payouts are more sensitive to creditor rights 
than they are to culture, yet culture moderates the effect of weak creditor rights on dividend payout 
policy.        
In summary, our findings in this paper suggest that creditors influence over corporate payout 
policy is influenced by legal rules and culture. When creditors rights are weak, cultural differences dictate 
how creditors influence dividend policy. Where the national culture is one that lends itself to individual 
goals and wants, creditors will not only perceive agency conflict to be severe, but will themselves pursue 
their own individual needs and exert their influence on firms to pay lower dividends. However, where the 
national culture is one that is more focused on group cohesion, even poorly-protected creditors will 
consider agency conflicts to be less severe and choose not to substitute their poor legal standing with 
lower dividends. The cultural effect is strong enough to substitute for weak legal rights. In collectivist 
traditions, dividend payouts are not lower under weak creditor rights, as creditors effectively view 
“strong” culture and weak legal rights as substitutes. The cultural effect is strong enough to moderate the 
effect of weak creditor rights on corporate dividend payouts.        
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section two develops two testable hypotheses. This is followed 
by a discussion of the data and the empirical design. Section four presents and discusses our findings, 
while section five concludes.   
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2. THEORIES and HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
In this section we develop testable hypothesis which address how creditor rights and culture may 
interact with one another to influence corporate dividend payout policy. We begin by reviewing the 
agency cost of equity and debt inclusive models of dividends. We then review the dividend-culture 
literature where the focus is on the relationship between insiders and shareholders. From here, we 
develop and state our hypotheses.  
 
a. AGENCY COST OF EQUITY AND DEBT MODELS OF DIVIDENDS 
The notion that dividends can curb agency costs of equity is not new (see for example, Rozeff, 
1982; Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986; Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; and Gomes, 2000, to name but a 
few). La Porta et al. (2000) formulate two competing, but not mutually-exclusive, agency theories of 
dividend payout, namely the outcome and substitution models. The equity-only version of the outcome 
model predicts a positive relationship between the strength of shareholder rights, which can be measured 
at the country or firm-level, and the likelihood of paying a dividend and the dividend amount.1 
Shareholders can use their legal rights to force firms to initiate a dividend in the first instance, and pay 
larger dividends once they ultimately decide to do so (see Mitton, 2004; Jiraporn et al., 2011; Bartram et 
al., 2012; Brockman and Unlu, 2009, 2011; Byrne and O’Connor, 2012; and Shao et al., 2013, to name but 
a few who find support in favour of the outcome model).  
The equity-only version of the substitution model says that firms can build “reputation capital” 
and substitute for poor governance/disclosure standards by establishing a history of paying large 
dividends over time to “convince shareholders that it will invest properly and for their benefit” (see 
Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2012, pp. 21; and Gan et al., 2014). Once trust has been established between 
insiders and outsiders, these firms benefit in terms of reduced financing constraints, higher growth rates, 
and higher firm value (see Gan et al., 2013). Presumably financially unconstrained well-governed firms 
pay lower dividends. Hence, the substitution model predicts a negative relationship between legal 
                                                 
1 La Porta et al. (2000) find that dividend payouts are an outcome of country-level shareholder rights. Mitton (2004) 
concludes that corporate dividend payouts are an outcome of effective corporate governance and country-level 
shareholder rights, and dividend payouts are largest where both country and shareholder are strong. Tse (2004) 
questioned the logic of using large dividends to reduce agency costs in well-governed firms, since agency conflicts 
and thus agency costs are likely to be low in these firms in the first instance. Dey (2008) suggests that this is not the 
case, since he finds that the incidence of agency conflicts is more likely in well-governed firms. 
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rights/governance and corporate dividend payouts. While studies to date have found mostly in favour of 
the outcome model, evidence has also been offered to support the substitution model (see for example, 
John and Knyazeva, 2006; Officer, 2007; Jiraporn and Ning, 2006; and Chae et al., 2009). Brockman and 
Unlu (2011) show that the substitution model prevails in countries where disclosure environments are 
opaque and the outcome model in countries where disclosure environments are transparent.    
More recently, others have extended the equity-only versions of the outcome and substitution 
models to consider the agency costs of debt. Brockman and Unlu (2009) contend that dividend payouts 
are more sensitive to country-level creditor and not shareholder rights, suggesting that it is creditors, and 
not shareholders, who exert the greater influence over corporate dividend policy. Poorly protected 
creditors substitute their weak legal rights with lower dividends. In other words, the equity-only version 
of the outcome model of dividends inclusive of agency costs of debt may not hold under weak creditor 
rights. Shao et al. (2013) and Byrne and O’Connor (2012) show that this is in fact the case. The outcome 
model prevails given strong shareholder and creditor rights only, and anomalously, the substitution model 
prevails under weak creditor rights. The former finding suggests that where creditor legal standing is 
weak, creditors demand, and firms consent to lower dividends. Shao et al. (2013) perform some additional 
tests and demonstrate that strong creditor rights do not substitute for poor shareholder rights; dividend 
payouts remain low in instances where shareholder rights are weak, yet creditor rights strong.  
   
b. AGENCY COSTS OF EQUITY MODELS OF CULTURE AND DIVIDEND PAYOUT 
Recently it has been suggested that cultural differences may help to explain why dividend policy 
varies substantially across countries. Bae et al (2012) suggest that the lack of consensus on the 
determinants of dividend policy may be due to the failure to consider cultural differences across 
countries.2 The idea that culture can help explain corporate dividend policy rests on the notion that the 
underlying shared beliefs and values of individuals in a society can have an influence on how corporations 
are managed and thus shape dividend policy. Cultural explanations for dividend policy have been offered 
                                                 
2 Cultural explanations have been offered for a wide range of financial issues such as how financial systems evolve 
(see Kwok and Tadesse, 2006), the capital structure of a firm (see Chui et al, 2002), corporate debt maturity (see 
Zheng et al., 2012), the corporate governance system (see Griffin et al., 2014), and corporate hedging (see 
Lievenbruck and Schmid, 2014).   
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by among others, Khambata and Liu (2005), Fidrmuc and Jacob (2010), Shao et al (2010), and Bae et al 
(2012).   
 Khambata and Liu (2005) use the Hofstede index to develop a measure of risk aversion (high 
uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation implies higher risk aversion) and find that more risk 
averse managers will be less likely to pay dividends, instead preferring to retain more cash in order to 
minimise default risk. Fidrmuc and Jacob (2010) examine the relationship between cultural differences 
and dividends in forty one countries and find that cultural differences do have significant explanatory 
power when explaining dividend payouts. Using the Hofstede index, they show that high individualism, 
low power distance, and low uncertainty avoidance are significantly associated with higher dividend 
payouts, even more so after accounting for the strength of shareholder rights.   
Bae et al (2012) argue that national culture can shape a firm’s dividend strategy because people’s 
subjective perceptions on the benefit of financial flexibility are contingent on the country’s culture, and in 
turn, financial flexibility influences dividend policy. They find that culture, measured by Hofstede’s 
uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, and long term orientation are significantly and negatively related to 
dividend levels of a firm, even after controlling for other firm and country-specific factors. Further, they 
find that the association between national culture and the dividend level of a firm varies with the level of 
shareholder protection. They show in cultures where agency conflicts are perceived to be more severe, 
dividend payouts are even larger when shareholders are well protected. They show not only that national 
culture and shareholder protection individually affect dividend payout policy, but also explain how 
national culture and corporate governance are interrelated in influencing dividend policy. Shao et al (2010) 
use Schwartz’s national culture dimensions. Focusing on the shareholder-management relationship, they 
find that conservatism is positively and significantly related to corporate dividend payouts while mastery 
is negatively and significantly related to corporate dividend payouts.  
These aforementioned papers all perform tests of the dividend-culture relationship where only 
the agency costs of equity are considered. For example, the relationship between dividend payout and 
individualism is positive because shareholders accept low dividends payouts in collectivist cultures but 
demand large dividends in individualist cultures to compensate for high agency costs of equity. Shao et al 
(2010) acknowledge that they have not taken the shareholder-debtholder relationship into consideration 
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in their analysis and suggest this as an area that warrants further research. In this paper we do just that by 
examining the relationship between individualism, creditor rights, and dividend policy. We test (a) the 
equity and debt inclusive dividend-creditor rights relationship in collectivist and individualist traditions 
and (b) the agency cost of equity cultural models of dividends inclusive of the agency costs of debt by 
testing the dividend-individualism relationship in strong and weak creditor rights regimes. In the next 
section we develop and state these hypotheses formally.   
  
c. HYPOTHESES 
In this section we develop our hypotheses together with a description of Hofstede’s 
individualism measure which is the culture measure we employ in this paper. Hofstede defines culture as 
“the collective programming of the mind distinguishing the members of one group or category of people 
from another”. Culture can seem to distinguish one group/society from another based on a certain set of 
values, beliefs and behaviours that are shared within a group that makes that group unique and 
distinguishable from another. The cultural index developed by Hofstede identifies five cultural 
dimensions, namely, individualism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, and long-term 
orientation. We use individualism to develop our hypotheses.   
  
Individualism, collectivism and the strength of creditor rights 
In societies when individualism is high the focus is on the pursuit of individual happiness, rather 
than the pursuit of the collective goal. In collectivist traditions individuals do not seek to maximize their 
own private benefits, but adjust their behaviour so that their behaviour and beliefs are in line with those 
of a wider group of other stakeholders, a group in which individuals value membership. These alternative 
value systems have important implications for the perceived severity of agency conflicts and, importantly 
for this study, for the potential role played by corporate dividend payouts in alleviating such agency 
concerns.    
First, in countries with an individualist tradition, investors are cognisant of the fact that insiders 
are likely to pursue their own self-interests and may engage in the consumption of private benefits. As a 
result, agency conflicts are expected to be severe, and because of this, shareholders demand large dividend 
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payouts from firms as a consequence. Firms cater to the desire for larger dividends since there are many 
reasons to suggest that doing so is also in their own best interests (see Faccio et al., 2001). The result is 
that in countries that score high in terms of individualism, dividend payouts are large (see Fidrmuc and 
Jacob, 2010).    
Dividend payouts are much lower in countries where collectivism prevails. Here the perception is 
that agency conflicts are less severe, as in these countries insiders are much less likely to consume private 
benefits. Instead, insiders behave in a manner consistent with the pursuit of an overall group goal, 
whereby the decisions made by corporate insiders benefit both insiders and outsiders alike. Where 
collectivism prevails, shareholders are prepared to accept lower dividend payouts.  
In this paper, we are interested in how individualism and creditor rights interact to influence 
corporate dividend payouts. We believe that the answer lies in how creditors perceive the extent of agency 
conflicts within countries. The perceived extent of agency conflicts which is shaped by culture can be in 
marked contrast to the level of agency costs implied by the strength of legal rights. Hence, culture and 
creditor rights can complement one another (e.g. high creditor rights in collectivist countries and low 
creditor rights in individualist countries), but can also substitute for one another. We turn to a discussion 
of these possibilities and the implications for the relationships between culture and dividend payout, and 
creditor rights and dividend payout, respectively.        
On the one hand, since insiders are much less likely to pursue their own best interests at the 
expense of creditors in collectivist traditions, dividend payouts are likely to be largely insensitive to the 
strength of creditor rights in these countries. Where creditor rights are strong, creditors are likely to 
accept the status quo, which are low dividend payouts in collectivist traditions. Furthermore, and as 
demonstrated by Shao et al. (2013), creditors will not use their strong legal standing to pressure firms to 
pay larger dividends, when there is no pressure from elsewhere to do so. In this paper, we hypothesise 
that strong creditor rights will not result in large dividends in collectivist traditions where low dividends 
are the cultural norm. Also, we hypothesise that creditors are unlikely to affect the cultural norm in 
collectivist countries by demanding even lower dividends where their legal rights are weak, because in 
collectivist countries the interests of large creditors are much more likely to be protected, hence no longer 
necessitating the need for restricted dividends to substitute for poor creditor rights.  
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In summary, since creditors are likely to accept the cultural norm for low dividend payouts in 
collectivist countries where creditor rights are strong, and are unlikely to demand even lower dividends 
given weak creditor rights, we conclude that the direction of the relationship between dividend payout 
and creditor rights in collectivist traditions is ambiguous, but we expect that the strength of the 
relationship is likely to be weak.    
In individualist cultures we hypothesize that the relationship between dividend payout and 
creditor rights is less ambiguous. Creditors will permit large dividend payouts in individualist countries 
where creditor rights are strong, but not so where their legal rights are weak. Given poor legal standing, 
creditors will demand lower dividend payouts in individualist traditions. An alternative view is that 
poorly-protected creditors may not seek lower dividend payouts in individualist societies because large 
dividend payouts serve to reduce agency conflicts in these regimes the first instance. If this is the case, we 
would expect to observe that dividends are positively related to individualism across the creditor rights 
spectrum. While we expect that creditors are likely to place restrictions in individualist societies given 
weak creditor rights, the possibility remains that they may not.     
In summary we expect to observe the following. First, dividend-creditor rights relationship is 
positive in individualist countries. Second, the dividend-individualism relationship is positive where 
creditor rights are strong. Third, where creditor rights are weak, creditors are much more likely to demand 
lower dividends in individualist countries, than they are in collectivist countries. However, since dividend 
payouts are already low in collectivist traditions, the relationship between dividend payout and 
individualism is ambiguous. These arguments allow us to state our first and second testable hypotheses, 
which are summarized in Table 1: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Dividend payouts are positively related to the strength of creditor rights in individualist 
cultural traditions. In collectivist traditions, the relationship between creditor rights and dividend payout 
is ambiguous.  
   
Hypothesis 2: Dividend payouts are positively related to individualism where creditor rights are strong. 
The relationship between dividend payout and individualism is ambiguous where creditor rights are weak.    
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3. DATA 
To test our hypotheses we estimate a series of pooled ordinary least squares, logit and Tobit 
regressions. Our approach differs from previous studies in that we examine the joint effect of creditor 
rights and individualism on dividend policy. To explore these issues, we source a sample of 17,544 firms 
from 28 countries. Table 2 summarizes the construction of our sample. Initially we sourced 36,089 firms 
from forty-five countries. We exclude firms from countries with mandatory dividend policies i.e., Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Greece, and Venezuela, resulting in a loss of 1,056 firms. We lose a further 2,789 firms 
with missing or abnormal data i.e. firms with negative net income, negative total assets, and negative cash 
flow, and 3,644 firms with insufficient control variable coverage (including the country-level disclosure 
measure). As is common in dividend payout studies we exclude financial and utility firms which further 
reduce our sample by 5,474 firms, resulting in a final sample of 17,544 firms. This sample covers the years 
from 1996 to 2007.3 We source the creditor rights measure from Djankov et al. (2007). Creditor rights 
ranges from a low of zero to a high of four, with higher values suggesting strong creditor protection. We 
use creditor rights for the year 2002.4 We employ the cultural dimension of individualism which we 
source from Hofstede (1980, 2001). Individualism captures the extent of individualism (high values of this 
measure) and collectivism (low values) in a society.  
Table 3 presents summary statistics for dividend payout, creditor rights and individualism. The 
United States (4,712 firms), Japan (3,333), and the United Kingdom (9,702) contribute the largest number 
of firms, while Argentina (47), Ireland (46) and Austria (54) provide the fewest. Sample-bias in favour of 
firms from the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom is common in these types of studies.    
We use five dividend payout measures, namely dividends-to-cash flow, dividends-to-earnings, 
dividends-to-assets, dividends-to-sales, and dividend payer. Dividends are total regular dividends paid to 
common shareholders, scaled by cash flow, earnings, assets, or sales, as indicated. Payer equals 1 if the 
firm pays a dividend in year t and zero otherwise. Table 3 outlines median payer by country. Payer is the 
proportion of firms in each country which pay a dividend and is calculated as follows. For each country, 
payer is calculated on a yearly basis from 1996 to 2007, and we report the median payer for each country 
                                                 
3 In a series robustness tests which follow in Tables 7 and 8 we show that our results are robust to increasing the 
sample size and extending the sample period. We discuss these issues later in the paper.   
4 In a series of unreported tests we find that our findings are unaffected when we use creditor rights for different 
years.   
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over this time interval.5 The amount paid in dividends varies greatly across countries. Dividend amounts 
are large in New Zealand (dividends-to-cash flow is 0.38), yet much smaller in Canada (dividends-to-cash 
flow is 0.05) and the United States (dividends-to-cash flow is 0.04). Payer exhibits similar variation across 
countries. The median firm in the United States does not pay a dividend, while the proportion of 
dividend payers in India is 0.94.  
Table 3 also reports creditor rights and individualism for each country. Creditor rights are strong 
in Hong Kong, New Zealand and the United Kingdom yet weak in Mexico and France. The United 
States, Australia, and the United Kingdom are individualist societies while Thailand, Singapore and Korea 
are collective in nature. Crucial to our analysis is that across countries of equal cultural standing (creditor 
rights), there exists sizable differences in creditor right protection (individualism). Australia and the 
United States score almost identically in terms of individualism, but are very different in how their legal 
system protected creditor interests. Argentina, a largely collective society, and the United States, 
individualist, provide the same level of creditor rights. Creditor rights are negatively correlated 
(unreported) with individualism, which suggest that with some exceptions, creditor rights are stronger in 
collectivist (low individualism) countries. For example, largely collective countries such as Hong Kong, 
the Netherlands and Korea (Republic) score highly in terms of creditor rights while the U.S., which is 
considered individualist, does not. The exceptions are provided by among others, Australia and Mexico. 
Australia, classified as individualist, provides stringent protection for creditors. Mexico, a collectivist 
country, does not.  
Panel B of Table 3 summarizes our five dividend payout measures. The average firm pays out 
just over ten percent of its cash flow as a dividend, yet the median firm pays no dividend at all. Panel C 
outlines the number of firm observations by year. The number of observations varies across years, 
ranging from 5,812 in 1996 to a high of 14,250 in 2005.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 This is the same approach used by DeAngelo et al. (2006) to calculate payer.   
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4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
UNIVARIATE COMPARIONS 
 We begin by presenting summary payout statistics by level of individualism and creditor rights. 
Consider Table 4. Here we divide our sample of firms as follows: firms are in countries with high (low) 
creditor rights if their country level score for creditor rights is equal to or greater than (less than) the 
(country) sample median, which is 2. Firms are in countries with high (low) individualism, if their country 
level individualism score is greater than (or less than) the (country) sample median, which is 68. This 
results in four distinct individualism/creditor rights regimes, namely (1) strong creditor 
rights/individualist, (2) weak creditor rights/individualist, (3) strong creditor rights/collectivist, and (4) 
weak creditor rights/collectivist. There are 5, 8, 6, and 9 countries in each of these four regimes, 
respectively.   
Table 4 reports median dividend payouts for each regime. The median dividend payout figure 
reported for each regime is the median of the individual country median payouts.6 The figures reported 
provide unconditional support in favour of our hypotheses, while also revealing the possible direction of 
the relationships that we earlier deemed ambiguous. In the top rows of Table 4, we test hypothesis 1, 
while an initial test of hypothesis 2 is provided underneath.   
First, dividend payouts are larger in individualist traditions under strong creditor rights. Using 
dividends-to-cash flow, median dividend payout is 0.13 under strong creditor rights and 0.09 under weak 
creditor rights. The proportion of firms which pay a dividend is also larger under strong creditor rights 
(compare 0.82 under strong creditor rights to 0.66 under weak creditor rights). Creditors appear to restrict 
dividend payouts in individualist cultures where their legal rights are weak. In contrast, we observe no 
such restriction in collectivist countries. Rather, where creditor rights are weak, dividend payouts are 
actually larger under weak creditor rights suggesting a negative relation between dividend payout and 
creditor rights in collectivist regimes.   
These summary measures provide initial support for hypothesis 1, since we observe that dividend 
payouts are positively related to creditor rights, but in individualist cultures alone. In collectivist societies 
                                                 
6 Appendix 1 shows the median dividend payout for each country classified according to each creditor rights/culture 
regime. We also report an average of the median dividend payouts, and the median dividend payouts for each 
regime after excluding firms from the U.K., U.S., and Japan.      
[15] 
 
the relationship between dividend payout and creditor rights is negative. Note that our main hypotheses 
do not rely on the prevalence of a negative relationship between dividend payout and creditor rights in 
collectivist countries. Rather, they rest on identifying individualism having a moderating effect on the 
creditor rights dividend payout relationship in collectivist countries. Notwithstanding the usual caveats, 
these simple comparisons do suggest that culture may serve to moderate the dividend-creditor rights 
relationship.   
The bottom rows of Table 4 also provide support in favour of hypothesis 2. Here the positive 
relationship between dividend payout and individualism, documented in the literature to date, manifests 
only under strong creditor rights. For example, under strong creditor rights, dividends-to-cash flow is 
0.13 in individualist societies and 0.05 in collectivist societies. Where creditor rights are weak, the 
direction of the aforementioned relationship is reversed; dividend payout is negatively related to 
individualism under weak creditor rights. Under weak creditor rights, dividend payouts are larger in 
collectivist societies.    
 
MULTIVARIATE REGRESSIONS 
Next we carry out a series of regressions to test our hypotheses. In all regressions, we control for 
firm size, firm growth, leverage, firm profitability, and growth opportunities. We also include a measure 
for dividend premium which captures investor’s appetite for dividend paying stocks.7 A priori, we expect 
the estimated coefficient on this variable to be positive (see Baker and Wurgler, 2004). These variables are 
defined in Appendix 2. All firm-level variables are sourced from Worldscope.        
We first consider the relationships between creditor rights and dividend payout, and 
individualism and dividend payout, respectively. We employ dividends-to-cash flow, dividends-to-
earnings, and payer as our payout measures, as indicated, and include creditor rights, individualism, and 
firm-level controls, with time and industry dummies in all regressions. The results from pooled ordinary 
least squares and logit regressions are presented in Table 5. In all regressions, the standard errors are 
                                                 
7 Dividend premium is measured on an annual basis for each country. It is computed as the ratio of the average 
market-to-book ratio of dividend paying firms to the average market-to-book ratio of non-paying firms. The average 
dividend premium for each country is reported in Appendix 3. They suggest that, all else equal, the greater appetite 
for dividend paying stocks is in Argentina and Mexico.     
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clustered by firm (see Petersen, 2009). The goal of Table 5 is to see if we can replicate the findings from 
the previous literature. Using creditor rights we can, using individualism, we cannot.     
The first observation we make is that creditor rights matter. The estimated coefficient on creditor 
rights is positive and is statistically significant at the 1% level. Interestingly, the estimated coefficient on 
creditor rights is negative when payer is the dependent variable. Next, we consider individualism. 
Previous studies find a positive relationship between individualism and dividend payout. In our analysis, 
we find the exact opposite. The estimated coefficients for individualism are negative. We believe that this 
is because the majority of firms in our sample are domiciled in countries where creditor rights are weak 
and the coefficients we observe are of the sign we would expect for individualism in countries with poor 
creditor rights, if our hypotheses are correct. The coefficient on individualism is negative and significant 
at the 1% level, suggesting that dividend payout and the likelihood of paying a dividend is lower for firms 
in individualist countries. This is in contrast to the findings of Fidrmuc and Jacob (2010) and others.8  
The control variables are almost always statistically significant and of the expected sign. We 
follow Brockman and Unlu (2011) and include the CIFAR9 measure of country transparency (its level and 
square) in all regressions, and like them we refer to this variable as “Disclosure” in all regressions.10 We 
find similar to them in all regressions. The estimated coefficient is negative for the level of disclosure and 
always positive on the squared disclosure term. These coefficient estimates suggest that the agency 
substitution model prevails in countries where disclosure is minimal and the agency outcome model of 
dividends is observed where disclosure levels are high. The sign on our remaining control variables are in 
line with what we expect to find. The dividend amount tends to be greater when firms are large and 
profitable. In contrast, growth firms with sizable growth opportunities pay either little or small dividends. 
The collective findings for size, profitability, growth and growth opportunities are in line with the life-
                                                 
8 Fidrmuc and Jacob (2010, pp. 331) find a positive dividend-individualism relationship using dividends-to-earnings, 
yet a negative relationship using dividends-to-cash flow. On closer inspection of their data, they conclude that the 
negative dividend-individualism relationship using dividends-to-cash flow is “driven by observations of relatively 
high dividend-to-cash flow ratios for the lowest quartile of individualism scores in our sample” and the relationship 
is positive from the second to fourth quartiles of individualism. We explore our data in the same manner and do not 
believe that our findings are governed by (abnormally) large dividend payouts in collectivist regimes.       
9 The index is created by examining and rating companies’ annual reports for their inclusion and exclusion of 
85 items and ranges from 0 to 100 with 100 as the highest standard. 
10 In a set of robustness tests which follow (see Tables 7 and 8), we show that our findings remain qualitatively the 
same when we use the revised anti-director rights measure in place of disclosure. Also, our conclusions remain 
unchanged when we simultaneously include disclosure and the anti-director rights index in the same regressions. 
This analysis is available from the corresponding author upon request.   
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cycle model of dividends (see DeAngelo et al., 2006; Denis and Osobov, 2008; Brockman and Unlu, 
2011; and Bulan, 2009, for a review of the life-cycle model). Leverage and dividend payout are negatively 
related since in firms where dividends are large, there is no requirement to employ debt in a bonding role. 
Finally, the coefficient estimate on the dividend premium variable is positive. With the exception of 
growth opportunities, the control variables are of the same sign in the logit regressions.   
The bottom rows of Table 5 shed light on the economic significance of creditor rights and 
individualism by outlining the predicted dividend payout amounts. We report the predicted payout as 
creditor rights changes from zero to four. For individualism, the predicted payouts are calculated by 
allowing individualism to change from an average of the bottom two individualism scores to an average 
of the top two scores. We adopt this approach because few countries score the same in terms of 
individualism, and as a consequence we do not want our predicted payouts to correspond to any one 
single country. The predicted payouts are calculated by evaluating all independent variables at their sample 
medians, for the year 2005 and for industrial firms. All else equal, as creditor rights increases from zero to 
four, dividends as a percentage of cash flow increases from 7.3% to 13%. In relative terms this amounts 
to a 78% increase in the dividend amount.  
  A min-to-max change in individualism results in a fall in dividends-to-cash flow from 12.3% to 
8.4%, or a relative change in payout of almost 32%. Alternatively, a max-to-min change in individualism 
results in a 46.4% increase in dividend payout in relative terms. This is in stark contrast to the predicted 
payouts outlined by Fidrmuc and Jacob (2010, pp. 327). They show that “high individualism results in 
dividend-to-earnings ratios that are on average 18% higher compared to collectivist countries”.   
We also present estimates of the predicted payouts using dividends-to-assets (%) and dividends-
to-sales (%) so that we can make comparisons between our findings and the findings of others. Brockman 
and Unlu (2009) show that dividends-to-sales (%) changes from 0.78% to 1.98% (or a 2.5 fold increase) 
given a worst-to-best change in creditor rights. We document a change in dividends-to-sales (%) from 
0.42% to 1.28%, or a 3.05 fold increase resulting from the same change in creditor rights. All in all, these 
estimates suggest that creditor rights and individualism exert both a sizable statistical and economically 
significant effect on the size and likelihood of corporate dividend payouts. The predicted payouts suggest 
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that corporate dividend payouts are most sensitive to changes in creditor rights than they are to 
individualism.    
We now explore our hypotheses further. To do so we run two separate regressions. First, we 
divide our sample into individualist and collectivist regimes and explore the dividend-creditor rights in 
each regime. If our hypotheses are correct, then a priori, we would expect to find that dividend payout is 
positively related to the strength of creditor rights in individualist cultures. The relationship between 
dividend payout and creditor rights in collectivist societies is ambiguous. Our findings from these set of 
tests are presented in Panel A of Table 6.  
Our second test approach involves dividing our sample into strong and weak creditor rights sub-
samples, and estimate dividend payout-individualism regressions in each creditor rights regime. A priori, 
we expect to find a positive relationship between dividend payout and individualism under strong creditor 
rights alone. Where creditor rights are weak, the nature of the relationship is much less obvious, and thus 
ambiguous. The results are presented in Panel B of Table 6. Byrne and O’Connor (2012) and Shao et al. 
(2013) adopt similar empirical approaches.    
Consistent with hypothesis 1, the coefficient estimate for creditor rights is positive (0.051*** 
employing dividends-to-cash flow) in individualist countries and is statistically significant. It is also 
positive and statistically significant for collectivist countries, yet it is much lower (0.010*** using 
dividends-to-cash flows), and is thus in line with our prior expectations. The difference in the slope 
coefficients on the creditor rights variable is largely supportive of hypothesis 1. In individualist societies, 
creditors demand lower dividends where creditor rights are weak, but tolerate larger dividend payouts 
where their legal rights are strong. In collectivist traditions, dividend payouts are broadly similar across 
the creditor right spectrum. The relationship between dividend payout and creditor rights is much flatter 
in collectivist regimes. Using dividends-to-earnings and payer, we again find support in favour of 
hypotheses 1, since it is only in individualist cultures that we observe a significantly positive relationship 
between dividend payout and creditor rights. Interestingly, in countries where collectivism prevails, the 
relationship between dividend payout and creditor rights, and dividend payer and creditor rights, is 
negative. These findings serve to remove the ambiguity surrounding the relationship between dividend 
payout and creditor rights in collectivist countries which we stated earlier in developing hypotheses 1.  
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The middle rows of Table 6 explore whether our findings have economic as well as statistical 
significance. Our in-sample dividend payout predictions suggest that they do. For example, in 
individualist cultures, dividends-to-cash flow is restricted to just 5.4% for the median firm where creditor 
rights is zero, yet is 11.3% in collectivist cultures where creditor rights is just as low. Where creditor rights 
are strong, dividends paid are much larger in individualist cultures.    
 The bottom rows of Table 6 test hypothesis 2, which predicts that dividend payouts are 
positively related to individualism when creditor rights are strong. Using the dividend amount (dividends 
relative to cash flow, earnings, assets, and sales, as indicated), we always find a positive estimated 
coefficient for individualism under strong creditor rights. This finding suggests that in individualist 
societies where ties between individuals are loose and agency conflict more severe, dividend payouts are 
large. Where creditor rights are strong, these large dividend payouts are maintained. In contrast, where 
creditor rights are weak, creditors place large restrictions on dividend payouts. When creditor protection 
is weak, the estimated coefficient on individualism is negative and statistically significant.  
Once again we can attach both economic and statistical significance to our findings. A worst-to-
best change in individualism results in a change in dividends-to-cash flow from 12.3 to 13.2% under 
strong creditor rights, yet a decrease from 20.4 to 5.1% under weak creditor rights. Where creditor rights 
are weak, creditors place large restrictions on dividend payout in individualist, but not in collectivist, 
traditions. Tests of hypothesis 2 using payer are reported in the furthest right column of Table 6. Using 
payer the estimated coefficient for individualism is negative (-0.002***) under strong creditor rights, and 
not positive as expected. However, under weak creditor rights, the estimated coefficient for individualism 
is negative and larger (-0.004***), which together with the estimated coefficient under strong creditor 
rights, lends support the main premise of hypothesis 2. That is, under weak creditor rights, the dividend 
amount is smaller and the likelihood of paying a dividend is much lower in individualist traditions.        
In Tables 7 and 8 we assess the robustness of our findings. In each table we perform the 
following tests. First, a potential concern with our findings is that they may be driven by an omitted 
country- or firm-level variable(s) correlated with creditor rights, individualism and dividend payout. To 
address this concern we include a number of additional country-level variables and a single firm-level 
variable identified in other studies to influence corporate dividend payouts. These are dividend tax 
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advantage, labour rights, stock market development, and corporate cash holdings. Dividend tax advantage 
(DTA) measures the after-tax value of one dollar paid out in dividends divided by the after-tax value of 
one dollar paid out in capital gains. DTA is sourced from Bartram et al. (2012) and Fidrmuc and Jacob 
(2010). The relationship between dividend payout and DTA has consistently been shown in previous 
studies to be positive. Yu (2010) finds a negative robust relationship between labor rights and dividend 
payouts. We source labour rights data from Botero et al. (2004). Twu (2012) shows that stock market 
development can explain part of the decline in the number of firms that pay dividends in recent times. 
We include a measure of stock market development (stock market capitalization to GDP), which we 
source from an updated version of Beck et al. (2000). Finally, we include corporate cash balances as an 
additional firm-level control variable in all regressions. Presumably, mature firms with large cash balances, 
pay large dividends. Cash is calculated as cash to book assets and is sourced from Worldscope.11 The first 
five rows in Panel A of Tables 7 and 8 report the coefficient estimates for creditor rights (Table 7) and 
individualism (Table 8) after adding DTA, labor rights, stock market development, all three country-level 
variables together, and cash to our baseline regressions reported in Panels A and B of Table 6.   
In panel B we report the estimated coefficients for creditor rights (Table 7) and individualism 
(Table 8) when we use dividends-to-assets in place of dividends-to-cash flow and dividends-to-earnings. 
In panel C we address concerns that our findings may not be universal but specific to the sample of firms 
we use and the period we cover. To address these concerns, we extend our sample to span the years from 
1981 to 2007, and include firms from countries with mandatory dividends and firms we previously 
eliminated because a disclosure score was not available for their country. The extended sample now 
includes firms from Brazil, Chile, Greece, Indonesia, Israel, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, South 
Africa, and Taiwan, which increases the number of countries from 28 to 39. This sample covers the 
period from 1981 to 2007 and results in a total of 186,833 firm-year observations.12 Appendix 4 outlines 
the sample size, dividend payout, creditor rights and individualism for each of these countries. Dividends-
to-cash flow ranges from 0 to 0.19, and creditor rights and individualism from 0 to 3, and 11 to 65, 
respectively. Where the larger and extended sample of firms is employed, country-level shareholder rights, 
measured using the revised anti-director rights index from Djankov et al. (2008) is included in place of 
                                                 
11 The inclusion of cash reduces our sample size to 89,471 firm-year observations.   
12 In the extended and larger sample, median creditor rights remains at 2. Median individualism is 51.   
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disclosure.13 Next we address concerns that our findings are unduly influenced by sample-bias created by 
the large number of firms in the U.S., the U.K., and Japan. We address this concern in two-ways. First, we 
estimate a series of weighted least squares regressions where the weight of each observation is the inverse 
of the number of observations in each country so that each country receives an equal-weighting. We also 
test hypotheses 1 and 2 without firms from the U.S., the U.K., and Japan. In Table 8 we address a 
concern that our tests of hypothesis 2 are influenced by how we differentiate between strong and weak 
creditor rights. While it is reasonable to assume that creditor protection is weak given scores of 0 and 1, 
and strong given scores of 3 and 4, a creditor rights score of 2 is at the margin. In these tests we exclude 
countries with a creditor rights score of 2. Finally, in the last panel of Tables 7 and 8, we estimate Tobit 
models to account for the censored nature of our dividend payout ratios (censored at zero).    
In summary we find that our findings are qualitatively unaffected given the battery of tests we 
perform in Tables 7 and 8. The dividend-creditor rights relationship is positive in individualist traditions, 
while much smaller and often negative in collectivist traditions. The dividend-individualism relation is 
positive under strong creditor rights and negative under weak creditor rights.  
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper we exploit cross-country variation in creditor rights and culture, proxied using 
individualism, and explore how they interact with each other to influence corporate dividend policy. Our 
findings support the contention of, among others, Aggarwal and Goodell (2014), who argue that ignoring 
the impact of national culture in finance research is not an optimal strategy and that there is plenty of 
scope for strengthening finance research by incorporating the impact of cultural dimensions. Previous 
studies which explore how the agency costs of debt together with the agency costs of equity influence 
corporate dividend policy have failed to acknowledge the role national culture might play. Our findings 
suggest that creditors influence over corporate payout policy is determined not only by the strength of 
creditor rights but also by culture. Where creditor rights are strong, creditors accept the status quo, that is, 
large dividends in individualist traditions, and small dividend payouts in collectivist cultures. The 
                                                 
13 The values of DTA, labor rights, stock market development, revised anti-director rights, and financial architecture 
are presented for each country in Appendix 3. In an additional set of (unreported) robustness tests, we find that our 
findings are unaffected when we simultaneously include disclosure and revised anti-director rights in the same 
regressions.      
[22] 
 
interaction of creditor rights and culture arises when creditor rights are weak. In individualist traditions, 
where agency costs of debt are high according to the law and culture, creditors place large restrictions on 
dividend payouts. In contrast where agency costs of debt are high as implied by weak creditor rights, yet 
low according to culture, creditors place few if any restrictions on dividend payouts. In this instance 
culture overrides legal rules to determine creditors influence over corporate dividend policy.   
Our findings have important implications for the dividend creditor rights and dividend-
individualism relations. In a sample of 17,544 firms from 28 countries, we show that the dividend creditor 
rights relationship is positive in individualist traditions yet negative in many instances in collectivist 
cultures. The dividend-individualism relationship is positive under strong creditor rights yet negative 
under weak creditor rights. Where creditor rights are weak, creditor rights and culture come together to 
influence corporate dividend policy.     
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Table 1 
Hypotheses relating national culture and creditor rights to payout policy 
 Creditor rights 
 
 
National culture 
 
Strong creditor rights Weak creditor rights Hypothesis 2 
Dividend payouts are 
positively related to 
individualism where 
creditor rights are strong. 
The relationship between 
dividend payout and 
individualism is ambiguous 
where creditor rights are 
weak 
Collectivism Low payout ? 
Individualism High payout Low payout 
 Hypothesis 1 
Dividend payouts are positively related to the strength 
of creditor rights in individualist cultural traditions. In 
collectivist traditions, the relationship between creditor 
rights and dividend payout is ambiguous 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Construction of the sample 
Number of firms Description 
36,089 Worldscope coverage of firms (active and inactive) in forty-five countries, 
between 1996 and 2007 
-1,056 Firms in mandatory dividend countries 
-2,789 Missing dividend data, negative dividends, sales, cash flow, earnings, assets 
-5,474 Financial and utility firms 
-3,644 Missing control variables 
-5,582 Firms with less than three firm-year observations 
  
17,544 Sample 
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Table 3 
Sample description 
This table reports summary statistics for our sample of firms. Panel A reports summary statistics by country. # Obs is the number of 
firm-year observations, and # Firms, the number of firms in each country. Average dividend payout is reported for each country. 
Dividend payout is dividends-to-cash flow (Div/CF), dividends-to-earnings (Div/E), dividends-to-assets (Div/Assets), and dividends-
to-sales (Div/Sales), as indicated. Payer is the proportion of firms in each country which pay a dividend. Payer is first calculated on a 
yearly basis from 1996 to 2007, and we report the median payer for each country over this time interval. Creditor rights are from 
Djankov et al. (2007) and correspond to values in 2002. Individualism is from Hofstede (2001). Dividend payout data is from 
Worldscope. Panel B reports summary statistics for each dividend payout measure. Panel C reports the number of observations by 
year. The sample period is 1996-2007. 
Panel A: Country-level data 
 
 Sample Dividend payout measures Creditor 
rights 
Individualism 
 # Obs # Firms Div/CF Div/E Div/Asset Div/Sales Payer 
Argentina 324 47 0.07 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.70 1 46 
Australia 4,486 778 0.19 0.28 0.02 0.02 0.56 3 90 
Austria 406 54 0.13 0.28 0.01 0.01 0.81 3 55 
Belgium 566 81 0.12 0.25 0.02 0.02 0.79 2 75 
Canada 5286 828 0.05 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.00 1 80 
Denmark 838 101 0.12 0.21 0.01 0.01 0.85 3 74 
Finland 563 88 0.23 0.39 0.03 0.02 0.87 1 63 
France 3,957 590 0.12 0.22 0.01 0.01 0.72 0 71 
Germany 4,054 595 0.11 0.22 0.01 0.01 0.59 3 67 
Hong Kong 4,988 739 0.15 0.20 0.02 0.02 0.64 4 25 
India 3,597 510 0.16 0.23 0.02 0.02 0.94 2 48 
Ireland 394 46 0.14 0.19 0.01 0.01 0.69 1 70 
Italy 1,259 176 0.12 0.26 0.01 0.02 0.80 2 76 
Japan 24,276 3,333 0.12 0.26 0.01 0.01 0.92 2 46 
Korea 5,031 783 0.08 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.79 3 18 
Malaysia 4,846 748 0.13 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.76 3 26 
Mexico 713 96 0.08 0.14 0.01 0.01 0.63 0 30 
Netherlands 1,141 136 0.18 0.30 0.02 0.01 0.82 3 80 
New Zealand 479 72 0.32 0.48 0.04 0.03 0.85 4 79 
Norway 799 120 0.11 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.62 2 69 
Singapore 3,223 516 0.17 0.24 0.02 0.02 0.82 3 20 
Spain 795 101 0.16 0.28 0.02 0.02 0.83 2 51 
Sweden 1,491 239 0.17 0.24 0.02 0.01 0.61 1 71 
Switzerland 1,454 174 0.13 0.24 0.01 0.01 0.86 1 68 
Thailand 2,535 347 0.18 0.28 0.02 0.02 0.83 2 20 
Turkey 920 165 0.11 0.19 0.02 0.01 0.52 2 37 
United Kingdom 9,702 1,369 0.16 0.25 0.02 0.02 0.65 4 89 
United States 36,726 4,712 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 1 91 
 Total Average Median 
 124,849 17,544 0.10 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.63 2 68 
Panel B: Dividend payout data 
 
 Mean Median 5% 25% 75% 95% 
Dividends-to-cash flow 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.42 
Dividends-to-earnings 0.18 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.69 
Dividends-to-assets 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 
Dividends-to-sales 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 
Payer 0.48 0.63 0.00 0.00 0.88 0.94 
Panel C: Annual number of observations 
 
Year  # Obs Year  # Obs Year  # Obs 
1996 5,812 2000 9,642 2004 14,178 
1997 6,487 2001 11,198 2005 14,250 
1998 7,053 2002 12,521 2006 13,637 
1999 8,098 2003 13,323 2007 8,650 
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Table 4 
Univariate comparisons and initial tests of hypotheses 1 and 2 
This table reports summary median payout statistics by level of culture and creditor rights. Firms are domiciled in 
countries with high (low) creditor rights (culture) if their country level score for creditor rights (culture) is equal to 
or greater (less than) the sample median. To calculate median payout, we calculate the median dividend payout for 
each country in each regime, and report the median of the median payouts. The median payouts for each country 
are reported in Appendix 1. The median values of creditor rights and individualism are based on the number of 
countries in the sample. Dividend payout is dividends-to-cash flow (Div-Cash flow), dividends-to-earnings (Div-
Earnings), or payer (Div-Payer), as indicated. Payer is the median proportion of firms in each regime which pay a 
dividend. Creditor rights are from Djankov, McLeish, and Shleifer (2007), and culture (individualism) is from 
Hofstede (2001). Asterisks denote significance of z-tests of the equality of medians, where *** denote significance 
at the 1% level. Appendix 1 provides median payout data for counties classified into one of the four 
culture/creditor rights regimes.   
 Test of hypothesis 1 
The relationship between dividend payout and creditor rights under individualist and collectivist 
cultural traditions 
 High individualism 
Strong versus weak creditor rights 
 
Low individualism (collectivism) 
Strong versus weak creditor rights 
 
 Strong 
Creditor 
Rights 
(n = 5) 
Weak 
Creditor 
Rights 
(n = 8) 
Difference: 
strong less 
weak 
(Relationship) 
Strong 
Creditor 
Rights 
(n = 6) 
Weak 
Creditor 
Rights 
(n = 10) 
Difference: 
strong less 
weak 
(Relationship) 
Div-Cash flow 0.13 0.09 0.04*** 
(Positive) 
0.05 0.12 (0.07)*** 
(Negative) 
Div-Earnings 0.22 0.19 0.03*** 
(Positive) 
0.12 0.22 (0.10)*** 
(Negative) 
Div-Payer 0.82 0.66 0.16*** 
(Positive) 
0.78 0.83 (0.05)*** 
(Negative) 
 Test of hypothesis 2 
The relationship between dividend payout and individualism under strong and weak creditor 
rights 
 Strong creditor rights 
High versus low individualism (collectivism) 
 
Weak creditor rights 
High versus low individualism (collectivism) 
 
 High 
Individualism 
(n = 5) 
Low 
Individualism 
(Collectivism) 
(n = 6) 
Difference: 
high less low 
(Relationship) 
High 
Individualism 
(n = 8) 
 
Low 
Individualism 
(n = 10) 
Difference: 
high less low 
(Relationship) 
Div-Cash flow 0.13 0.05 0.08*** 
(Positive) 
0.09 0.12 (0.03)*** 
(Negative) 
Div-Earnings 0.22 0.12 0.10*** 
(Positive) 
0.19 0.22 (0.03)*** 
(Negative) 
Div-Payer 0.82 0.78 0.04*** 
(Positive) 
0.66 0.83 (0.17)*** 
(Negative) 
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Table 5 
Dividend payout, creditor rights and culture 
This table reports coefficient estimates from pooled ordinary least squares and logit regressions with t-stats adjusted 
for clustering at the firm level presented underneath in parenthesis. The sample period is 1996-2007. The dependent 
variable is dividends-to-cash flow, dividends-to-earnings, or payer, as indicated. All country and firm-level variables 
are defined in the main text. A full set of year and industry fixed effects are included but not reported, and ***, **, 
and * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. The bottom panel’s report estimates of 
the economic significance of creditor rights and individualism by presenting predicted dividend payout. The figures 
reported for creditor rights relate to the predicted payout amount for creditor rights ranging from zero to four. For 
individualism, the figures reported relate to the predicted payout amount ranging from an average of the bottom two 
to an average of the top two scores for individualism. The predicted payouts are calculated by evaluating all 
independent variable at their sample medians, for the year 2005 and for industrial firms (i.e., firms coded as 1 using 
Worldscopes general industry classifications). The bottom panel reports predicted payout ratios for each payout 
measure. Predicted dividends-to-asset (%) and dividends-to-sales (%) are also reported.        
 Panel A 
 Dividends-to-cash flow Dividends-to-earnings Payer 
Creditor rights 0.014*** 
(11.12) 
0.010*** 
(4.61) 
-0.019*** 
(6.92) 
Individualism -0.001*** 
(11.25) 
-0.001*** 
(9.84) 
-0.002*** 
(11.98) 
    
Disclosure -0.039*** 
(8.61) 
-0.060*** 
(9.27) 
-0.101*** 
(9.97) 
Disclosure2 0.0003*** 
(9.20) 
0.0004*** 
(9.53) 
0.001*** 
(9.98) 
Shareholder rights 
 
0.010*** 
(4.04) 
0.027*** 
(9.36) 
0.114*** 
(22.89) 
Size 0.014*** 
(29.65) 
0.028*** 
(40.79) 
0.071*** 
(36.65) 
Growth -0.016*** 
(15.15) 
-0.021*** 
(14.62) 
-0.033*** 
(7.50) 
Leverage -0.082*** 
(28.92) 
-0.097*** 
(22.33) 
-0.368*** 
(27.88) 
Profitability 0.028*** 
(15.91) 
0.022*** 
(9.21) 
1.794*** 
(81.71) 
Tobin’s q 0.010*** 
(11.64) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
-0.074*** 
(32.69) 
Dividend premium 0.072*** 
(11.81) 
0.078*** 
(8.69) 
0.044*** 
(3.22) 
Industry and time dummies Included Included Included 
# Observations 124,849 124,849 124,849 
R-Squared 0.155 0.163 0.413 
 Economic significance of in-sample predictions for payout ratios (%) 
 
Creditor rights 7.3 to 13.0 15.1 to 18.5 0.51 to 0.37 
Individualism 12.3 to 8.4 21.0 to 14.0 0.65 to 0.40 
 Economic significance of in-sample predictions using alternative payout ratios (%) 
 
 Dividends-to-assets (%) Dividends-to-sales (%)  
Creditor rights 0.45 to 1.46 0.42 to 1.28 
Individualism 1.16 to 0.53 1.17 to 0.43  
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Table 6 
Regression based tests of hypotheses 1 and 2 
This table reports coefficient estimates from pooled ordinary least squares and logit regressions with t-stats adjusted for clustering at the firm level presented underneath in 
parenthesis. The sample period is 1996-2007. The dependent variable is dividends-to-cash flow, dividends-to-earnings, or payer, as indicated. The top panel presents 
coefficient estimates from separate regressions estimated by level of individualism. The bottom panel presents coefficient estimates from separate regressions estimated by 
strength of creditor rights. A full set of controls, year and industry fixed effects are included but not reported, and ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 
10% levels, respectively. The bottom rows of each panel reports estimates of the economic significance of creditor rights and individualism. The figures reported for creditor 
rights relate to the predicted payout amount for creditor rights ranging from zero to four. For individualism, the figures reported relate to the predicted payout amount 
ranging from an average of the bottom two to an average of the top two scores for individualism. The predicted payouts are calculated by evaluating all independent variable 
at their sample medians, for the year 2005 and for industrial firms. Predicted dividends-to-asset (%) and dividends-to-sales (%) are also reported.     
Panel A: Hypothesis 1 “Dividend payout-creditor rights” regressions in individualist (high individualism) and collectivist (low individualism) traditions  
  Dividends-to-cash flow  Dividends-to-earnings Payer 
 Individualism Collectivism Individualism Collectivism Individualism Collectivism 
Creditor rights 0.051*** 
(18.01) 
0.010*** 
(3.28) 
0.074*** 
(19.23) 
-0.013*** 
(5.41) 
0.016*** 
(12.23) 
-0.114*** 
(19.14) 
Controls, industry and time dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# Observations 67,124 57,725 67,124 57,725 67,124 57,725 
R-Squared 0.236 0.140 0.261 0.110 0.464 0.403 
Creditor rights range 0 to 4 0 to 4 0 to 4 0 to 4 0 to 4 0 to 4 
Predicted payout by creditor rights 5.4 to 25.9 11.3 to 13.2 10.3 to 40.4 26.3 to 21.1 0.33 to 0.89 0.90 to 0.55 
Predicted dividend-to-assets (%) 0.8 to 2.8 0.5 to 1.3  
Predicted dividend-to-sales (%) 0.7 to 2.1 0.4 to 1.1 
Panel B: Hypothesis 2 “Dividend payout-individualism” regressions in strong (high creditor rights) and weak creditor rights (low creditor rights) countries 
  Dividends-to-cash flow  Dividends-to-earnings Payer 
 Strong 
Creditor rights 
Weak 
Creditor rights 
Strong 
Creditor rights 
Weak 
Creditor rights 
Strong 
Creditor rights 
Weak 
Creditor rights 
Individualism 0.001* 
(1.81) 
-0.002*** 
(21.28) 
0.013* 
(1.72) 
-0.004*** 
(25.93) 
-0.002*** 
(4.46) 
-0.004*** 
(19.22) 
Controls, industry and time dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# Observations 39,194 85,655 39,194 85,655 39,194 85,655 
R-Squared 0.192 0.179 0.189 0.224 0.444 0.451 
Individualism range 18 to 90 20 to 91 18 to 90 20 to 91 18 to 90 20 to 91 
Predicted payout by individualism 12.3 to 13.2 20.4 to 5.1 24.0 to 25.4 37.7 to 8.7 0.81 to 0.63 0.92 to 0.28 
Predicted dividend-to-assets (%) 0.9 to 1.1 1.9 to 0.4  
Predicted dividend-to-sales (%) 1.3 to 1.4 1.6 to 0.4 
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Table 7 
Hypothesis 1: robustness tests 
This table reports coefficient estimates for creditor rights in a series of ordinary least squares, logit and tobit 
regressions. Separate regressions are estimated by cultural tradition (individualism and collectivism). The dependent 
variable is dividends-to-cash flow, dividends-to-assets, and payer, as indicated. Panel A includes a number of 
additional country- and firm-level determinants of dividend payout not included previously. Panel B uses dividends-
to-assets. The sample period is 1996-2007. Panel C employs a larger sample of firms over a longer time period. The 
larger sample includes firms from Brazil, Chile, Greece, Indonesia, Israel, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, 
South Africa, and Taiwan and the sample period extends from 1981 to 2007. In this larger sample, the country 
median individualism is 51. Panels D and E address concerns that our findings are driven either by unequal number 
of observations across countries. In Panel D we estimate weighted least squares regressions where the weight of 
each observation is the inverse of the number of observations in each country, so that each country receives an 
equal weighting. In Panel E, firms from Japan, the UK and the US are excluded. Panel F presents coefficient 
estimates from tobit regressions. A full-set of firm and country controls, industry and time fixed effects are 
included, but not reported. All variables are defined in the main text, and ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 
1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.     
Hypothesis 1 
“Dividend payout-creditor rights” regressions in individualist (high individualism) and collectivist (low 
individualism) traditions  
 Dividends-to-cash flow Payer 
Panel A. Coefficient estimates for creditor rights including different country- and firm-level control variables 
Control variables added Individualism 
 
Collectivism Individualism Collectivism 
Dividend tax advantage (DTA) 0.047*** 
(16.06) 
-0.011*** 
(5.88) 
0.017*** 
(11.67) 
-0.104*** 
(13.97) 
Labour rights 0.047*** 
(12.55) 
0.005** 
(2.21) 
0.011*** 
(9.55) 
-0.109*** 
(14.39) 
Stock market development 0.046*** 
(16.71) 
-0.001 
(0.37) 
0.015*** 
(11.68) 
-0.102*** 
(14.44) 
All of the above included  0.026*** 
(7.03) 
0.000 
(1.20) 
0.010*** 
(6.10) 
-0.024** 
(1.96) 
Cash* 0.053*** 
(17.70) 
0.010*** 
(5.33) 
0.021*** 
(11.55) 
-0.106*** 
(15.96) 
Panel B. Coefficient estimates for creditor rights using dividends-to-assets 
Creditor rights 0.010*** 
(14.13) 
0.002*** 
(11.39) 
n/a 
 
n/a 
Panel C. Coefficient estimates for creditor rights using larger sample 
Creditor rights 0.023*** 
(17.38) 
0.011*** 
(6.48) 
0.061*** 
(15.01) 
-0.043*** 
(5.39) 
Panel D. Coefficient estimates for creditor rights using regression weights 
Creditor rights 0.041*** 
(10.62) 
0.010*** 
(2.77) 
0.086*** 
(9.50) 
-0.018* 
(1.70) 
Panel E. Coefficient estimates for creditor rights excluding firms from Japan, UK, and the US 
Creditor rights 0.035*** 
(10.67) 
0.002 
(0.55) 
0.060*** 
(8.23) 
-0.077*** 
(5.43) 
Panel F. Coefficient estimates for creditor rights using Tobit estimation 
Creditor rights 0.029*** 
(51.50) 
-0.002*** 
(3.77) 
n/a n/a 
* When we include cash as a control variable, the sample sizes in individualist and collectivist regimes are 45,283 
and 44,188, respectively.   
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Table 8 
Hypothesis 2: robustness tests 
This table reports coefficient estimates for individualism in a series of regressions. Separate regressions are 
estimated by strength of creditor rights. The dependent variable is dividends-to-cash flow, dividends-to-assets, and 
payer, as indicated. Panel A includes a number of additional country- and firm-level determinants of dividend 
payout not included previously. Panel B uses dividends-to-assets. The sample period is 1996-2007. Panel C employs 
a larger sample of firms over a longer time period. The larger sample includes firms from Brazil, Chile, Greece, 
Indonesia, Israel, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, and Taiwan and the sample period extends 
from 1981 to 2007. Panels D and E address concerns that our findings are driven either by unequal number of 
observations across countries. In Panel D we estimate weighted least squares regressions where the weight of each 
observation is the inverse of the number of observations in each country, so that each country receives an equal 
weighting. In Panel E, firms from Japan, the UK and the US are excluded. Panel F excludes countries with a 
creditor rights score of 2. Panel G presents coefficient estimates from tobit regressions. A full-set of firm and 
country controls, industry and time fixed effects are included, but not reported. All variables are defined in the main 
text, and ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.      
Hypothesis 2 
“Dividend payout-individualism” regressions in strong (high creditor rights) and weak creditor rights (low creditor 
rights) countries  
 Dividends-to-cash flow Payer 
Panel A. Coefficient estimates for individualism including different country- and firm-level control variables 
Control variables added Strong 
Creditor rights 
regime 
Weak Creditor 
rights 
regime 
Strong 
Creditor rights 
regime 
Weak Creditor 
rights 
regime 
Dividend tax advantage (DTA) 0.001*** 
(3.01) 
-0.002*** 
(20.77) 
-0.002*** 
(3.63) 
-0.005*** 
(21.47) 
Labour rights 0.001* 
(1.94) 
-0.002*** 
(16.47) 
-0.002*** 
(3.83) 
-0.004*** 
(16.65) 
Stock market development 0.001 
(1.75)* 
-0.002*** 
(20.36) 
-0.002*** 
(4.20) 
-0.004*** 
(19.25) 
All of the above included 
 
0.004* 
(1.76) 
-0.002*** 
(15.69) 
-0.002*** 
(3.85) 
-0.004*** 
(16.86) 
Cash* 0.001* 
(1.73) 
-0.002*** 
(19.97) 
-0.002*** 
(3.97) 
-0.006*** 
(18.34) 
Panel B. Coefficient estimates for individualism using dividends-to-assets 
Individualism 0.001* 
(1.82) 
-0.0003*** 
(14.18) 
n/a n/a 
Panel C. Coefficient estimates for individualism using larger sample 
Individualism 0.001*** 
(7.26) 
-0.001*** 
(24.95) 
-0.001*** 
(4.91) 
-0.010*** 
(40.84) 
Panel D. Coefficient estimates for individualism using regression weights 
Individualism 0.001*** 
(5.43) 
-0.002*** 
(10.79) 
-0.001*** 
(3.44) 
-0.002*** 
(3.73) 
Panel E. Coefficient estimates for individualism excluding firms from Japan, UK, and the US 
Individualism 0.001* 
(1.68) 
-0.002*** 
(13.47) 
-0.002*** 
(3.96) 
-0.004*** 
(7.34) 
Panel F. Coefficient estimates for individualism excluding countries with creditor rights equal to two 
Individualism 0.001 
(0.61) 
-0.002*** 
(5.95) 
-0.002*** 
(4.46) 
-0.004*** 
(9.21) 
Panel G. Coefficient estimates for individualism using Tobit estimation 
Individualism 
 
0.004*** 
(6.96) 
-0.002*** 
(97.04) 
n/a n/a 
* When we include cash as a control variable, the sample sizes in strong and weak creditor rights regimes are 35,902 
and 53,569, respectively. 
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Appendix 1 
Median dividend payout by individualism and creditor rights regimes 
This table reports the median dividend payout in countries differentiated by culture and creditor rights. Median 
dividend payout is reported for each country and the average and median of these median payouts is presented 
underneath. Separate figures are also reported for weak creditor rights regimes where countries with a creditor 
rights score of two are excluded, and without firms from the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan. The 
median figures for the full sample are reported in Table 4.    
Hypothesis 1 
The relationship between dividend payout and creditor rights under individualist and collectivist cultural traditions 
Individualism and Strong Creditor rights Individualism and Weak Creditor rights 
 D/CF D/E Pay  D/CF D/E Pay 
Australia 0.00 0.00 0.55 Belgium 0.09 0.24 0.79 
Denmark 0.09 0.20 0.85 Canada 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Netherlands 0.18 0.33 0.82 France 0.08 0.19 0.72 
New Zealand 0.32 0.54 0.85 Ireland 0.12 0.18 0.69 
United Kingdom 0.13 0.22 0.65 Italy 0.09 0.25 0.80 
    Norway 0.00 0.00 0.62 
    Sweden 0.10 0.19 0.61 
    United States 0.00 0.00 0.00 
        
Median 0.13 0.22 0.82 Median 0.09 0.19 0.66 
Average 0.14 0.26 0.74 Average 0.06 0.13 0.53 
Median (excl. UK) 0.14 0.27 0.84 Median (excl. US) 0.09 0.19 0.69 
     
    Excluding countries with creditor rights score of 2 
    Median 0.08 0.18 0.61 
    Average 0.06 0.11 0.40 
 
Hypothesis 2 
The relationship between dividend payout and individualism under strong and weak creditor rights 
Collectivism and Strong Creditor rights Collectivism and Weak Creditor rights 
 D/CF D/E Pay  D/CF D/E Pay 
Austria 0.12 0.29 0.81 Argentina 0.00 0.00 0.70 
Germany 0.00 0.00 0.59 Finland 0.22 0.41 0.87 
Hong Kong 0.00 0.00 0.64 India 0.14 0.21 0.94 
Korea 0.04 0.11 0.79 Japan 0.09 0.22 0.92 
Malaysia 0.07 0.13 0.76 Mexico 0.00 0.00 0.63 
Singapore 0.10 0.18 0.82 Spain 0.14 0.26 0.83 
    Switzerland 0.12 0.25 0.86 
    Thailand 0.12 0.25 0.83 
    Turkey 0.00 0.00 0.52 
        
Median 0.05 0.12 0.78 Median 0.12 0.22 0.83 
Average 0.06 0.12 0.74 Average 0.09 0.18 0.79 
    Median (excl. Japan) 0.12 0.23 0.83 
     
    Excluding countries with creditor rights score of 2 
    Median 0.06 0.13 0.78 
    Average 0.09 0.17 0.77 
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Appendix 2 
Variable descriptions 
Variable Description Source 
 
Coverage 
Dividends-to-cash flow Dividends per share/cash flow per share Worldscope 1996-2007 
Dividends-to-earnings Dividends per share/earnings per share Worldscope 1996-2007 
Dividends-to-assets Total (common) dividends to total assets Worldscope 1996-2007 
Dividends-to-sales Total (common) dividends to total sales Worldscope 1996-2007 
Payer 1 if the firm pays a dividend in year t, zero otherwise Worldscope 1996-2007 
Size Log of book assets in US$ (Log of book sales in US$ used in div-to-assets regressions) Worldscope 1996-2007 
Growth Logarithmic one-year sales growth Worldscope 1996-2007 
Profitability Earnings before interest and taxation to book assets Worldscope 1996-2007 
Leverage Total debt to total assets Worldscope 1996-2007 
Tobin’s q Tobin’s q is defined as the book value of debt less plus market capitalization divided by 
the book value of assets 
Worldscope 1996-2007 
Cash Cash to book assets Worldscope 1996-2007 
Creditor rights  An index aggregating creditor rights, following La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1998). The index ranges from 0 (weak) to 4 (strong creditor rights) and is 
constructed as at January for every year from 1978 to 2003. We use creditor rights data for 
the year 2002 
Djankov et al. (2007) 2002 
Individualism Captures the extent of individualism and collectivism in a society. Individualism and 
collectivism are defined in the main text 
Hofstede (2001) 
Various years 
Disclosure  Country-level accounting disclosure score assigned by Center for International Financial 
Analysis and Research (CIFAR) 
CIFAR (1995) and  
Hope et al. (2007) 
1993 
Labour rights Employment laws index from Botero et al. (2004). The employment laws index combines 
four sub-indexes, namely (1) alternative employment contracts, (2) cost of increasing 
hours worked, (3) cost of firing workers, and (4) dismissal procedures.    
Botero et al. (2004) 1997 
Stock market development Stock market capitalization to GDP in each year from 1996 to 2007 Beck et al. (2000) (updated) 1996-2007 
Dividend tax advantage The after-tax value of one dollar paid out in dividends divided by the after-tax value of 
one dollar paid out in capital gains. Dividend tax advantage is for 2001 
Bartram et al.(2012) and 
Fidrmuc and Jacob (2010) 
2001 
Shareholder rights Revised version of the original anti-director rights index of La Porta et al. (1998) Djankov et al. (2008) 1997 
Dividend premium The ratio of the average market-to-book of dividend paying firms to the average market-
to-book of non-paying firms. Dividend premium is calculated annually for each country 
Worldscope 1996-2007 
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Appendix 3 
Country-level variables 
This table reports country-level variables for our sample of countries. Dividend tax advantage variable 
measures the after-tax value of one dollar paid out in dividends divided by the after-tax value of one 
dollar paid out in capital gains, and is sourced from Bartram, Brown, How and Verhoeven (2012) and 
Fidrmuc and Jacob (2010). Disclosure is a country’s disclosure score assigned by the Center for 
International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR, 1995). Labour rights are sourced from Botero et 
al. (2004). Stock market development is stock market capitalization to GDP and is sourced from an 
updated version of Beck et al. (2000). Dividend premium is computed annually for each country and is 
computed as the ratio of the average market-to-book of dividend paying firms to the average market-to-
book of non-paying firms. Shareholder rights are the revised anti-director rights index of Djankov et al. 
(2008).     
 Dividend 
tax 
advantage 
(DTA) 
Disclosure 
 
Labour 
rights 
 
Stock 
market 
dev 
 
Dividend 
premium 
 
Shareholder 
rights 
(Revised 
ADR Index) 
Argentina 1.0000 68 0.3442 38.58 1.24 2 
Australia 0.8372 80 0.3515 110.06 0.95 4 
Austria 0.7500 62 0.5007 23.30 0.79 2.5 
Belgium 0.8500 68 0.5133 68.27 0.95 3.0 
Canada 0.7905 75 0.2615 107.40 0.81 4 
Denmark 0.6387 75 0.5727 57.90 0.90 4 
Finland 1.0782 83 0.7366 130.08 1.06 3.5 
France 0.6569 78 0.7443 79.47 0.99 3.5 
Germany 0.7276 67 0.7015 47.11 1.07 3.5 
Hong Kong 1.0000 73 0.1696 339.12 0.83 5 
India 0.7435 61 0.4434 47.40 1.49 5 
Ireland 0.6105 81 0.3427 59.74 0.75 5 
Italy 0.8726 66 0.6499 44.62 1.07 2 
Japan 0.5797 71 0.1639 78.06 0.92 4.5 
Korea 0.6895 68 0.4457 55.46 0.82 4.5 
Malaysia 1.0000 79 0.1885 141.56 0.96 5 
Mexico 1.0000 71 0.5943 23.41 1.24 3 
Netherlands 0.7000 74 0.7256 113.96 0.82 2.5 
New Zealand 1.0088 80 0.1607 39.54 1.07 4 
Norway 1.0753 75 0.6853 44.73 0.89 3.5 
Singapore 0.9713 79 0.3116 185.63 0.94 5 
Spain 0.8509 72 0.7447 71.37 0.94 5 
Sweden 0.7568 83 0.7405 104.83 0.87 3.5 
Switzerland 0.5850 80 0.4520 229.64 1.04 3 
Thailand 1.0286 66 0.4097 51.56 0.99 4 
Turkey 0.6168 58 0.4026 22.40 1.13 3 
Utd Kingdom 0.8571 85 0.2824 141.99 0.82 5 
United States 0.7033 76 0.2176 135.07 0.85 3 
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Appendix 4 
Countries included in extended sample 
Panel A reports summary statistics for firms from countries not included in the original sample. # Obs is 
the number of firm-year observations, and # Firms, the number of firms in each country. Median 
dividend payout is reported for each country. Dividend payout is dividends-to-cash flow (Div/CF), 
dividends-to-earnings (Div/E), as indicated. Payer is the proportion of firms in each country which pay a 
dividend. Payer is first calculated on a yearly basis from 1981 to 2007, and I report the median payer for 
each country over this time interval. Creditor rights are from Djankov et al. (2007) and correspond to 
values in 2002. Individualism is from Hofstede (2001). Panel B outlines the number of firm-years (#Obs) 
and firms for each country in the original sample of firms examined over the extended sample period. 
Dividend payout data is from Worldscope. 
Panel A 
 
 Sample Dividend payout measures Creditor 
rights 
Individualism 
 # Obs # Firms Div/CF Div/E Payer 
Brazil 1,572 209 0.03 0.19 0.56 1 38 
Chile 951 119 0.19 0.34 0.75 2 23 
Greece 1,771 238 0.16 0.34 0.68 1 35 
Indonesia 2,059 250 0.00 0.00 0.33 2 14 
Israel 511 92 0.00 0.00 0.30 3 54 
Pakistan 937 93 0.12 0.22 0.60 1 14 
Peru 379 55 0.00 0.00 0.43 0 11 
Philippines 921 118 0.00 0.00 0.33 1 32 
Portugal 548 58 0.05 0.19 0.54 1 27 
South Africa 2,341 267 0.15 0.25 0.59 3 65 
Taiwan 6,479 1,121 0.10 0.19 0.62 2 17 
 18,469 2,620  
Panel B 
 
Number of firm-years and firms for original country sample over extend sample period 
 # Obs # Firms  # Obs # Firms 
 
Argentina 413 51 Korea 5,749 789 
Australia 5,038 788 Malaysia 6,067 806 
Austria 651 60 Mexico 892 100 
Belgium 1,008 90 Netherlands 1,923 146 
Canada 6,828 860 New Zealand 593 73 
Denmark 1,396 120 Norway 1,164 132 
Finland 1,214 114 Singapore 3,584 516 
France 6,671 647 Spain 1,192 104 
Germany 6,342 662 Sweden 2,382 275 
Hong Kong 5,448 739 Switzerland 2,218 183 
India 3,804 509 Thailand 2,873 347 
Ireland 643 49 Turkey 1,078 171 
Italy 1,815 181 United Kingdom 14,113 1,388 
Japan 34,059 3,374 United States 49,206 4,832 
[36] 
 
 
